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There is not currently a developed market for long-term social care insurance in England.
Policymakers are interested in what behavioral influences should be considered in the
design of insurance products for long-term social care to increase uptake. This review
describes the behavioral factors that might be barriers or facilitators of uptake and
could be considered in future policy solutions. Behavioral factors include psychological
capabilities (knowledge and understanding), which are important given that public
knowledge on this topic is poor. Psychological motivations (reflective or automatic biases)
may also influence consumers’ decision-making. Cultural factors such as language
barriers and family norms for caring are considered. Overall, the authors demonstrate
processes by which the uptake of long-term social care insurance can be encouraged,
pertinent to policymakers.
Keywords: social care insurance, behavioral science, decision-making, inequality, preferences
INTRODUCTION
Social care in older age affects most people at some point in their lives, but it is not well-understood
by much of the general public in England. The system for providing care toward the end of life
is called long-term social care. It is designed to support older people’s welfare and may include
assistance with personal care or with shopping and meal preparation. Assistance is provided
through different avenues such as residential care homes, home-based care systems, home-help
services, and day centers. Each of these avenues is designed to meet the needs of the adult requiring
social care help. In general, across many countries, including the UK and Europe, the costs for these
services fall to the public (e.g., through the tax system) but are heavily means-tested.
The demand for social care is rising. Projections from the Personal Social Services Research
Unit suggest that the number of older people unable to conduct one or more activities of daily
living (ADLs) without help, such as dressing and feeding, will rise from 1.7m in 2015/6 to 3m in
2040 (1). The total demand for all adult formal care services is expected to increase from just over
900,000 users in 2015/16 to over 1.6m by 2040/41, representing an increase of 70% (1). There is
a need to meet this demand to ensure older people’s welfare. The introduction of the Better Care
Fund Policy Framework 2017–2019, which covers issues such as an aging population and inflation
rates, suggests that social care is a priority for the UK government (2, 3).
Despite the priority of social care, evidence suggests rising demand cannot be met. In England,
local authorities are responsible for distributing the public funding of social care. The introduction
of a Social Care Precept in 2016–2017 meant that an increase in council tax (3% per year) was to
contribute to more social care, but workforce changes, as well as the reduction inmoney distributed
by local authorities, negatively affected the ability of some individuals to access social care when
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needed (4, 5). From 2017 to 2018, adult social care saw an increase
in expenditure of £402 million with the total cost spent by local
authorities totalling £17.9 billion. Long-term support saw the
largest increase in expenditure (£369 million to £14.0 billion)
with 1.8 million requests for adult social care [NHS (6)]. Even
with increased expenditure, it is predicted that by 2019/2020
the funding gap in the social care sector will reach up to £2.1
billion (5).
Some of these funding gaps may filled by self-funding
individuals.Most social care is self-funded, particularly to achieve
a good quality of life. This is in contrast to healthcare which
is provided free of charge by the National Health Service
(NHS), where there is means-tested state support for those who
cannot afford it, the details of which are set out in legislation.
However, the majority of individuals will have to take financial
responsibility for their social care from their savings and income.
Where this is the case, some individuals are not aware of how
much financial responsibility is allied to their social care (7). It
can be difficult to predict social care needs of the future, and
many individuals are not aware that they are required to pay
for it themselves. It is, therefore, important that individuals are
informed that not all levels of social care are covered in the same
way as the NHS1.
One way to fill the gaps in social care funding is through social
care insurance. Insurance providers can help consumers’ make
an informed choice about their social care based on financial
factors such as savings and value of their own home. However,
uptake of social care insurance is low. Prior research by Francesca
et al. (9) has established several reasons for this, including
consumers’ perceptions of their level of future care needs, as well
as high insurance premiums, affordability, competing financial
obligations, premium volatility, and questionable eligibility of
individuals for private insurance products (that may, e.g., exclude
people with pre-existing health conditions). Some individuals
may also rely on family or friends to provide assistance in
their care needs instead of relying on social care insurance.
Additionally, the contracts associated with social care insurance
are also often complex and individuals struggle to assess their
value for money, especially when financial literacy is low (10).
Social Care Insurance Packages
This research focusses on psychological processes that may
influence the uptake of social care insurance in England. To
understand these, we need first to describe the available products.
In recent years, particularly since late 2016, there have been
changes to long-term care insurance. An overview of the different
paid social care insurance options, as stipulated by the Chartered
Institute Insurance (11) is shown in Table 1. This also includes
state care funded through the NHS and local authorities (12).
In this Table, we differentiate between state-level insurance and
the four other products by referring to the latter as pay-in
insurance types.
We acknowledge that social care insurance is not only a
priority in England. Internationally, social care insurance differs.
Although some countries have successfully mandated universal
1An exception to this is Continuing Healthcare – see NHS UK (8).
care coverage systems (e.g., Netherlands, Sweden, Japan,
Germany, France and Korea), the financial sustainability of these
systems has been questioned (15). There is a mismatch between
the expected care benefits and the financial contributions citizens
make. Some of the schemes have reduced care benefits available
to the population. For example, in Japan, accommodation costs
within social care packages were removed, and consumers had
to fund their own housing arrangements (16), which accentuated
economic inequalities (17).
In other countries, such as Germany, higher earners must
sign up to private health and social care plans (18). Whilst we
acknowledge countries differ in terms of their approach to social
care funding and long-term care, there is a general consensus
across several countries that the private insurance market for
social care is small and does not function well (15). There
have been several initiatives implemented in OECD countries
to increase the uptake of private insurance, such as introducing
tax incentives, building a bridge between private and public
coverage mechanisms, and encouraging contributions during
employment (9).
Since uptake is generally low, lessons can be learned from
international evidence on social care insurance uptake. Using
such evidence, Cylus et al. (19) propose how England could
change the uptake of social care insurance. One suggestion is to
introduce a social insurance scheme – also known as mandatory
insurance – in place of, or to supplement, the current tax-funded
care system in England. One country that does so is Germany
(20). Such policies work on the principle that as more people
contribute to the system, there is an increase of risk-pooling,
which reduces the provider’s risks for incurring high costs in
the future, and, therefore, individual contributions are lower
(21). While mandatory structural changes may be important, the
focus of this review is on psychological barriers to uptake within
England in the context of the current social care system.
Uptake of Social Care Insurance
In England, individuals deemed as ineligible for state-funded
social care are thought to either rely on care from their family,
continue without care, or purchase care privately (22). A report
by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) found that < 1%
of the UK population has long-term social care insurance (23).
However, individuals are predicted to spend up to £100,000 in
costs on their social care (24). Social care insurance could more
evenly distribute the costs of care throughout the population.
One psychological process that is a barrier to the uptake of
social care is a lack of future planning. In general, individuals
do not plan early for future social care need. A lack of future
planning was identified earlier by Francesca et al. (9), and has
been corroborated by other research (25, 26). It is well-known
that many individuals have a myopic outlook and focus on the
short rather than the long-term (27). People also have limited
knowledge of social care options (7). Lack of planning could lead
to individuals being “forced” to make decisions at a certain point
of need when they may experience a high level of emotion and
time pressure (28).
Another barrier is the complexity of the decision-making
process about social care insurance. This was again discussed by
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TABLE 1 | Summary descriptions of available social care insurance packages.
Insurance package Description
State-level insurance (NHS & Local
authority funded)
– A means-tested scheme – based on the individual’s currentsavings
◦ If the individual has < £23,250 in savings, which is the current rate in England, his/her care will be paid for partly or
fully by the local authority
◦ The value of his/her property (residence) is taken into account
– Some services are free and are notmeans-tested
◦ Reablement (free care for up to 6 weeks after leaving hospital)
◦ Complex/serious health conditions which are assessed by healthcare professionals – if deemed eligible, the social
care is solely arranged and funded by the NHS, not the local authorities (12)
Pure protection (pay in - pre-paid) – Taken out before care is required (pre-paid)
– Paid monthly to the insurance provider
– Benefits available for a fixed term (e.g., 3 years)
– Benefits can be paid to the consumer or the person providing the care (usually a care provider)
– The FCA handbook (2019) states the benefits of the scheme (as part of a signed contract) are only available to the
individual under the following conditions: injury, sickness orinfirmity
Investment linked (pay in - pre-paid) – Taken out before care is required (pre-paid)
– A lump sum is paid to the insurance company
– Involves a single-premium investment (often called an investment bond) and protection insurance
– Single-premium investment which grows over time
– Money is taken from the investment fund (regular deductions) to fund the protection element
– The money that is in the investment bond is excluded from the means tested calculation undertaken by the local
authority, when calculating the cost for care
◦ Based on the assumption that money will be considered as a life insurance policy (13)
Immediate care (pay in - time of need) – Taken out once the need for care has arisen
– A single premium is paid into an enhanced annuity (although annuity is not common in social care)
◦ For example, release equity from home – allows the individual to take a lump sum, tax free from their home
– Takes into account life expectancy
– Individuals pay for immediate care monthly, based on a cost calculated from the care needs at the beginning; but by
taking calculated life expectancy into account, there is a risk that the insured will live longer than the predicted life
expectancy – and becomes more costly
– Not all care costs may be covered, depending on the ongoing care needs of the individual (14)
Late life policies (pay in - time of need) – Can have this as an add-on option and pay higher premium to get the benefit
– The individual pays a cash lump sum on the diagnosis of a specific diagnosis of particular illnesses that require
long-term care (e.g., motor neurone disease, Parkinson’s disease)
– Other later life policies are designed for specific ages orillnesses:
◦ No cost under age 65 but can get benefits later in life if they are diagnosed with needing long-term care after 70
years old
◦ Pays out a later life benefit if diagnosed as needing long-term care after a certain age
◦ Adds a later life benefit after the diagnosis of an additional long-term careillness
Francesca et al. (9). There are numerous social care packages
available to consumers, and this fact is unknown to many
in the UK (7). The variety adds to the difficulty about the
decision-making process when choosing the right package. In
addition, individuals need to understand their eligibility for
possible funding from the state and differences between state-
and self-funded options. Complexities also arise because there
are different sources of support available from local authorities,
financial representatives, and social networks of friends and
family members.
To understand the behavioral factors that should be
considered in the design and promotion of insurance products
for social care, we apply an integrative framework for
understanding and changing human behavior. We draw on
the five main social care insurance types outlined Table 1 and
provide examples from each of these different care insurance
products. Using the behavior change framework, we discuss
barriers to the uptake of such products. These barriers include the
issues around future planning and complexity discussed above,
as well as others, such as access to social care, inequalities,
and social norms. Finally, we propose some policy level
remedies to increase uptake, such as effective ways to market
care insurance products and to help consumers with their
decision-making processes.
The COM-B Model
To understand the potential decisions and behavioral
barriers affecting these decisions, we draw attention to an
integrative framework for understanding and changing
behavior. This framework is the Capabilities, Opportunities
and Motivations – Behavior (COM-B) model (29, 30). The
COM-B model describes a system comprised of several
interacting components: Capabilities (psychological, physical),
Opportunities (social, physical) and Motivations (reflective,
automatic), which produce Behavior. These are necessary and
sufficient conditions for every behavior to occur. A summary
description of these components is in Table 2. We also apply
the MINDSPACE framework within the automatic subset of
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Capability Concerning both physical and psychological capacity to take up social care insurance.
Physical capability can be achieved facilitated through skill development, such as training. Individuals’ capabilities limited by their body because
they are disabled in some way; and therefore, this category also relates to old, sick, or disabled individuals.
Psychological capability includes having the necessary knowledge and skills to understand and navigate social care, and also possessing the
capacity to engage in the necessary cognitive processes such as comprehension, reasoning, decision making, attention and memory. Achieved
through imparting knowledge or understanding, and by training emotional, cognitive and behavioral skills. About ability to perform - whether people
find it difficult or not.
Opportunity Factors, namely social and physical that lie outside the individual that make the behavior possible or prompt it.
Social opportunity is afforded by the cultural milieu that dictates the way that people think, including the set of shared values and practices that
characterize institutions and groups. Happens when family and friends are encouraging and supportive, such as when they may help us find time
and space to engage in behaviors that facilitate the uptake of social care insurance, when they openly discuss and share information, and when our
awareness is raised by people we know.
Physical opportunity is about the infrastructure or technology available for people, such as levels of access to social care services or products. It
may not necessarily be about individual behavior, but this determinant can guarantee sustainability of the target behaviors.
Motivation All those brain processes that energize and direct behavior, which includes reflective and automatic mechanisms.
Reflective motivations involve evaluations (also known as attitudes) – weighing up the perceived benefits and costs of social care; goal setting –
thinking about the outcome you want to achieve – including abstract long-term goals and short-term goals about social care; and planning –
creating an action plan to achieve an outcome by specifying where, when, and how to execute an action. Public policies targeting reflective
motivation traditionally include information provision and economic incentives.
Automatic motivations involve processes that are associative and comprise mental phenomena such as habits, impulses and heuristics.
Automatic motivations play a key role in decision making, which is studied by behavioral economists. The MINDSPACE Framework (31, 32) is a
summary categorization of nine largely automatic and contextual effects on motivation and behavior (see Table 3). MINDSPACE is also an acronym
that describes the most effective ways to influence automatic motivation, which is why the framework is widely used in public policy.
motivations to discuss in greater depth how motivations are
explicitly important in behavior change (31–34). A summary
description of these conditions and their components is
in Table 3, and the suggestions we make based on these
components are in Table 4.
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
We apply the COM-B model to understand the behavioral
barriers and enablers that may be implicated in the process of




Individuals must have the physical ability to access information
about insurance products. Physical disabilities (partially sighted,
limited hearing) or mental disabilities (e.g., severe learning
disabilities) may limit an individual. This category also relates to
people who are older, sick, or who may have physical difficulty
using the internet or visiting banks in rural locations.
To accommodate various physical capabilities, information
should be physically available in a variety of formats e.g. in braille,
large font, or audio. This is important for all possible social
care insurance packages to ensure that everyone has access to
the information appropriate to them. If a sudden illness occurs
that puts an individual at a physical disadvantage, their physical
capability may be impeded as a result of the event. In such
cases, family members and advisors should be encouraged to
support the disabled person to make an appropriate choice. For
example, children are an important source of support in making
long-term care insurance decisions for their parents, such as
by taking charge of handling the insurance and considering the
investment (39).
Psychological Capabilities
Individuals deciding on their social care should have the mental
capacity to process the information (40). Individuals need to
understand each of the different options available and the
potential benefits or disadvantages of specific insurance packages.
In general, it has been found across several countries that
consumers lack good financial knowledge (41). This lack of
knowledge about finances, or “financial literacy,” may hinder
consumers’ abilities to make appropriate financial decisions
(10). As such, Brown and Finkelstein (42) highlight the need
for policies to be created for increasing the uptake of long-
term care insurance and consumers’ understanding of the
different products.
Some segments of the population may not understand
the information given to them (e.g., where English is not a
first language or vulnerable adults). Moreover, for those that
are more vulnerable, they may be misled into paying higher
premiums when they have been sold a ‘quality’ package that
includes luxurious (but not necessarily needed) social care. Such
individuals may not be aware of all financial consequences (such
as monthly payments.) The risk of needing social care might
be exaggerated, and some people may assume that they must
pay into a care insurance package to have the correct level
of social care without knowing the allowance they get from
state-level funding.
To overcome a lack of or reduced psychological capabilities,
information about social care insurance should be simplified,
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TABLE 3 | Description of the overarching components in MINDSPACE, aspects of which are taken directly from Dolan et al. (31) and Dolan et al. (32, 35).
Mindspace
Factors Description
Messenger: we are heavily influenced
by who communicates information
The person conveying the information about care insurance to the consumers. Is the messenger someone they know?
Does the messenger already have this insurance? Is the messenger a specialist in this field? If a family member or a
friend discusses this package with us, we may be more likely to search for more information and then opt to speak to a
specialist about it.
Incentives: our responses to incentives
are shaped by predictable mental
shortcuts such as strongly avoiding
losses
If an insurance policy is promoted in an incentivised way, consumers may not be able to resist a good bargain. In these
situations, a range of behavioral biases may be implicated in consumers’ decision-making process. If paid insurance
products are to be saleable, as well as having distinct advantages over a free option, it must also be incentivised to
combat particular behavioral biases.
Norms: we are strongly influenced by
what others do
Motivations can also be influenced by social norms – such that individuals may be motivated by others around them
who have already adopted the same insurance policy.
Defaults: we go with the flow? of
pre-set options
Inert and inattentive consumers are likely to stick with the default if they are auto enrolled in a specific insurance type.
For example, FCA’s insurance supervision work found the example of similar motor add-on insurance products sold by
similar firms having very different penetration rates because one had a default from which consumers had actively to
opt-out, while the other had not. In fact, 80% of consumers bought the add-on when they had already been
automatically opted-in by default, compared to 40% when they had to actively choose to purchase it themselves (36).
Salience: our attention is drawn to what
is novel and seems relevant to us
Salience can be induced by techniques such as ‘prompts’ to increase awareness of care costs when people are
considering their future income (e.g., making changes to their pension), during salient life moments (e.g., when helping
parent with their care needs, particularly 55–65 years of age), or when people reach certain age (e.g., 60). Such
prompts could be letters by NHS or local authority.
Priming: our acts are often influenced
by sub-conscious cues
For priming to work, Papies (37) considers three main principles. Firstly, a target group needs to be identified – in this
situation we can consider two groups: those that plan and wish to invest in pre-paid insurance and those that require
time of need insurance. For the former, the primed concepts may relate to motivationally relevant goals i.e., their
long-term social care. For the latter, this may relate to a more immediate goal of having an appropriate package of care
insurance that meets their current health and social care needs (e.g., individuals might think more favorably of time of
need insurance after exposure to words like “comfort” “flexibility” “support” “personalized”). Secondly, primes
associated with the motivation should be presented very close to the decision point. Finally, individuals must know the
outcomes from the decision.
Affect: our emotional associations can
powerfully shape our actions
Emotional associations can shape insurance-related decisions. Hsee and Kunreuthe (38) demonstrated that affect
influences decisions about whether to purchase insurance, such as when people are willing to pay twice more to insure
a beloved antique clock (that no longer works and cannot be repaired) against loss in shipment than to insure a similar
clock for which “one does not have any special feeling.” Social care insurance products should be advertised with
emotive language touching upon something the target audience can relate to on a personal level; such as when
Immediate Care and Late Life Policies are offered to relatives of the person who needs care.
Commitments: we seek to be
consistent with our public promises,
and reciprocate acts
Here we focus on the idea of reciprocity. This is relevant for the buy-in insurance packages, where companies may give
“free advice” and in return people are likely to repay the favor by buying the product.
Ego: we act in ways that make us feel
better about ourselves
Consumers may choose to invest in care insurance products if such purchases produce a positive impression to
others that we have planned carefully.
and, if possible, presented visually. For example, infographics can
improve cognition with pictures that enhance the visual system’s
ability to see patterns and trends (43). Presenting the information
in multiple formats or languages can assist in meeting a variety
of psychological capabilities, as well as physical capabilities, as
mentioned above. Harder-to-reach groups (e.g., migrants, self-
employed) should be considered, so they are aware of the tax-
based system that provides care and support for all individuals
(44). This could be accomplished by tailoring information based
on the needs of these groups.
To help people to put money aside for care insurance,
insurance products could provide tools to earmark outgoing
money and aid budgeting. Research shows that calculation aids,
such as annual cost calculators, facilitate the choice of the most
cost-effective health or social care insurance plan (45). These
tools could be online, using an app, spreadsheet, or paper
book [see Elliott (46), for examples]. Some banks offer accounts
that prompt customers to set up saving goals (pots) for many
purposes, including life events such as a wedding, house deposit,
education, or travel. These products enable customers to set goals
for specific purposes and could prompt setting up saving pots for
“social care” (35). The government could work with the financial
services industry (including fintech companies) to promote and
support the creation of such products and features.
Opportunities
Physical Opportunities
People need particular resources to make decisions about social
care insurance. Physical opportunities include access to retail
and advice services, financial resources, the availability choice of
products, and local area competition.
To overcome challenges to physical access, financial
institutions should be easily contactable. This is especially
important for time of need policies because individuals must
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Present information in variety of formats, e.g., braille, large font, audio, different languages
Encourage family members and advisors to support individuals with physical limitations
Capability,
psychological
Provide educational materials using simplified information, such as visual infographics
Tailor educational information to sub-groups, such as migrants or the self-employed
Provide budgeting tools such as cost calculators and prompt social care as a savings goal
Opportunity,
physical
Provide contact options online, over the phone, face to face, and via the post
Provide opportunities to contact experts quickly
Opportunity,
physical, social




Encourage family members, friends and colleagues to tell others about the benefits of enrolment
Educate the public that social care does not operate the same way as health care in the NHS
Consider potential spillover effects onto social cohesion and health
Motivation,
reflective
Providing information about possible lifestyles in pre-paid packages in similar ways as time-of-need insurance
Align opportunities to individual differences such as current state of health, risk aversion, and level of assets, such as by using motivational
interviewing, vignettes, and option grids
Provide positive social comparison feedback, e.g., by telling participants positive information about their performance relative to others, including,
and include positive information about aging
Tailor messaging to age of recipient
Encourage financial goal setting with achievable steps, such as by using implementation intentions
Prompt individuals to think of their long-term goals
MINDSPACE (automatic motivation)
Messenger Information should come from people who are perceived as having authority, share similarities, and that people like or who create positive feelings in
the recipient
Incentives Consider how information about investments and payoffs are framed and consider testing words such as spend or payment vs. invest or earnings
Using smaller, such as weekly, rather than longer, such as annual, payment frames
Use price dripping of “good” costs first
Provide a timeline of expenses
Make care insurance offers when another expenditure is terminated (such as children leaving home)
Add on social care insurance to other expenses like mortgages
Focus on losses associated with not investing in social care (e.g., losing one’s home)
Provide limited edition packages and discounts
Offer a future salary sacrifice scheme
Norms Provide information on the (high) proportion of people who purchase social care insurance, or who think planning for long term care is important,
especially the proportion of those in one’s local social groups Avoid providing information about the high proportion of people who do not have
social care insurance
Defaults Set up social care insurance payments to be automatic, such as by using direct debits
Provide pre-set, default options for social care insurance in a selection of options
Salience Make the benefits of social care insurance novel and relevant by using a simple format
Survey consumers to draw attention to certain aspects of social care
Provide feedback on investment goals
Include a unique and personal option in a choice set
Priming Promote care insurance using media stores, such as negative stories about care homes or positive stories about the quality of private healthcare
Affect Use attractive imagery to promote insurance
Consider ’peace of mind’ campaigns
Offer insurance after critical events such as illness
Promote insurance using well-known brands that people like
Commitment Allow a holding period for social care insurance options
Provide free trials
Offer social care insurance to customers who already have other products from the same insurance provider
Ego Use age-progressed renderings of people’s future selves
Warn customers about overconfidence in their ability to pay for social care or to manage care needs
Start with low charges and increase when expectations about future care needs increases to address overconfidence
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TABLE 5 | Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy for men and women by neighborhood, England. Data from ONS (47).
Deprivation decile Life Expectancy (LE), at birth, years Deprivation decile Health Life Expectancy (HLE), at birth, years
Male Female Male Female
Most deprived Most deprived
1 74.1 79.1 1 52.2 52.4
2 76.2 80.7 2 56.2 56.3
3 77.3 81.5 3 58.4 59.6
4 78.5 82.3 4 61.6 61.6
5 79.5 83.2 5 62.8 64.2
6 80.1 83.6 6 65.5 65.7
7 81.0 84.2 7 66.5 67.0
8 81.5 84.5 8 67.5 68.0
9 82.0 85.1 9 68.5 69.4
10 83.1 86.0 10 70.5 71.3
Least deprived Least deprived
Gap 9.0 6.9 Gap 18.3 18.9
make prompt decisions about their care. Diverse contact modes
could increase access, including online, over the phone, face-
to-face, and via post. In some cases, where pre-paid insurance
particularly appeals to older populations, there may be a
stronger need for easy access to experts who can explain things
appropriately. Experts within these institutions should be easily
contactable within local insurance providers or support services
such as Citizens Advice.
Limited opportunities due to financial resources must be
considered in the context of inequalities. Healthy life expectancy
is strongly linked to social advantage and lengthy periods of
morbidity before death are associated with disadvantage. There
is an 18-year gap in healthy life expectancy by neighborhood-
level deprivation (see Table 5). The need for social care services
is not uniformly spread among the older adults; instead, it is
highly skewed toward those in relative and absolute disadvantage.
Many relatively younger older people who are disadvantaged will
experience ill health considerably earlier in life than those who
have more financial resources. While there will be individual
variations – not all rich people live to a healthy old age – themean
differences between population groups and areas matter.
These inequalities will impact the effectiveness of the
behavioral (or other) incentives put in place to encourage the
uptake of social care insurance. In general terms, groups with
the greatest needs will not be able to afford such products at any
point in their lives – even when their insurable risk would keep
premiums relatively low. These inequalities may be gendered,
as women have lower lifetime earnings and live for longer in
poor health. As women age, premiums will become increasingly
out of reach. Those whose needs are either less or whose need
occur later in life will be in a better financial position. Even then,
the scale of premiums might make such an offer unattractive to
someone with limited financial resources.
Inequalities in access to, and utilization of, health and social
care are not necessarily inequitable. For example, women’s longer
lifespans may put them at a relative advantage to men from a
welfare perspective, even if women’s longer life is spent in poor
health and with limited access to social care [see (48, 49)]. This
debate is beyond the scope of this review. Nevertheless, social
care insurance should be introduced with the knowledge that, at
best, it will have no effects on inequalities gradients, or, at worst,
make inequalities worse. The idea of selective insurance cover
does not deal with the volume of social need that will be required
by that part of the population, who, because of morbidity in mid-
life, will be virtually uninsurable. Public funding would be needed
to support these groups, producing a two-tier system that would
again create inequalities.
Inequalities relating to behavioral interventions to promote
social care insurance should be documented and researched in
more detail in the UK context. For example, research on how
individuals triangulate affordability could be conducted to assess
whether there is a “tipping point” in consumers’ perceptions of
affordability. In other words, at what point does affordability
become a concern, and for whom? Future work could research
using scenarios where parameters related to affordability are
manipulated, such as in terms of losses or gains in future health
and welfare, risks about these losses and gains, and the degree of
the losses, gains, and risks. Effects on hypothetical uptake could
be observed. Research could also be conducted on the public
acceptability of a two-tiered system for social care insurance and
the potential impacts on inequalities between groups to inform
the parameters of a social welfare function.
Social Opportunities
Although different insurance packages present various
opportunities to satisfy one’s care needs, socially,
individuals may make decisions according to social cues or
interpersonal influences.
Cultural norms may be particularly influential in some cases.
For example, in Asian cultures, the family is perceived as
responsible for social care (50), which may negatively affect
uptake. In the UK, the NHS has existed since 1948 and provided
care free at the point of delivery universally. There is no payment
transaction if a person uses the NHS to see a doctor in primary
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care or to attend A&E or for hospital admission and stay.
This is so deeply ingrained in British culture that shifting the
idea to a payment system would require considerable normative
realignment. Of course, some parts of health care are provided on
a fee for service basis – especially dentistry and optician services –
and there is a private sector for those who can afford it. But
for issues like chronic disease, cancer, COPD, kidney disease,
mental illness, and orphan (very rare) diseases, all of which are
the most expensive to treat, the NHS is the bedrock on which
everyone depends.
Social care is not part of the NHS system in the same way
as medical care, and it comes as a surprise to many people to
find that the kinds of services needed by older adults are not
entirely free at the point of delivery. This is made the more
difficult by the fact that the lines between what is medical care
and what is social care, and what care takes place in hospital and
what takes place in the community, can be blurred, and there is
considerable local variation. The problem that this presents for a
system designed to introduce private insurers is that it could look
as if the state is abrogating its responsibility for the vulnerable
in society. The means-tested system for social care in England
is often, culturally, seen degrading, as it is allied to a benefits-
like system for people who cannot afford standard living costs
and are supplemented by government funds (51). So, although
there is considerable evidence relating to social insurance models
working in other countries (18), it is quite another matter as to
whether those findings could be applied in the specific cultural
context of England.
What can be done to address misguided beliefs that social
care is provided entirely by the NHS? Having precedence for
a particular delivery model may help the public accept a new
policy. For example, in Germany, the population found social
care insurance more acceptable because insurance was already in
place for health (18). However, there is no precedent for social
insurance in the UK. We do acknowledge that state support will
continue to exist; however, the cultural expectations in England
stem from general healthcare being funded by the NHS, a system
that is free at the point of use and through taxation – yet long-
term social care does not work through this model. Instead,
providing information that emphasizes social care is not provided
by the NHS could help to decouple the association between social
and medical care in people’s minds and encourage them to plan
for the future.
Separately from the broader culture of medical care in the
UK, there may be ways to leverage smaller networks and more
local norms to promote the uptake of social care insurance.
Social norms create social opportunities, especially among wider
social support networks that may consist of both formal and
informal relations, such as careers or local authorities. Gino and
Galinsky (52) reported that individuals often seek additional
advice from those regarded as close when making important
decisions. If one family member, peer-group, or workplace opts
for a paid insurance package, others may follow suit. In one
experiment on this topic, a random sample of employees in select
departments were encouraged to attend a benefits information
fair (53). Enrolment in the pension scheme months after the fair
was significantly higher in departments where some individuals
were encouraged to attend, and the results suggested that friends
and colleagues in the same department told their peers about
the benefits of enrolment, thus creating social opportunities. A
similar approach could be used to increase the uptake of social
care insurance.
There are limitations to relying on social norms and networks.
If others are not paying for care insurance, it could be challenging
to break convention. This may become an issue for those that
would benefit from additional care support provided by pre-
paid care insurance (pure protection, investment linked) products
(54, 55). There is a growing “family care gap” and reliance on
family may not be sustainable for future generations, yet family
support is still at the forefront of care rather than services (56).
Economically, and also on a social opportunity level, there may
be yet another manifestation of inequalities. Consumers within
social groups where friends or family have opted for an insurance
package may not be able to afford to themselves, which may
reduce social cohesion. Higher income inequalities can lead
to lower social cohesion and poor health status (57, 58), and
any behavioral intervention focussed on norms should consider
potential spillover effects onto social cohesion and health.
Motivations
Reflective Motivation
Public policies targeting reflective motivation traditionally
include information provision and economic incentives. For
example, buying care insurance would require evaluations about
whether or not such a product is needed as a result of information
about the benefits and costs associated with the product.
When individuals face multiple choices, reflective motivations
involve comparing the differences and similarities between the
available insurance packages. Opting for a pay-in insurance
package may allow individuals to get the social care they need
when required, and decisions need to be made between pre-
paid vs. time-of-need insurance. This is important in the early
stages of long-term care planning because both paid options
will be available. Decision-makers will also need to take into
account factors such as their current state of health, level of state
support, and care coverage. Consumers may lack knowledge of
where their money is going if they cannot see what care will be
provided when buying a pre-paid option, whereas they may be
able to see the care home provided when buying time-of-need
insurance. Providing information about possible lifestyles in pre-
paid packages in similar ways as time-of-need insurance could
help facilitate reflective motivation.
Alongside general information about the costs and benefits
of different social care insurance options, reflective motivations
may stem from individual differences in what consumers desire
from their future long-term care. Examples include attachment
to a particular home in the family (i.e., the asset itself, as opposed
to just its value); and attachment to keeping housing assets as
inheritance for family, but not necessarily the particular home
itself (i.e., agnostic about home being sold, as long as value is
retained). Individuals may differ in their motivations to have
a certain quality of care, living standard, or income, and may
be more or less “risk averse” or plan to different degrees for
financial shocks. There may also be some individuals who are
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less motivated to take risks with their finances in the domain of
long-term care.
Importantly, consumers may have multiple motivations.
To address this, interventions could employ the motivational
interviewing technique (59–61). This technique adopts a
counseling style for eliciting behavior change by helping
individuals to explore and resolve ambivalence, which is achieved
by asking the person to articulate their “pros” and “cons” to
facilitating processing and ultimately resolve the conflict between
them. Motivational interviewing could be embedded in an
instrument, such as a survey from an advisor. This approach
would enable social care insurance options to be tailored to
individual differences in preferences and desires about long
term care.
In situations requiring simultaneous consideration of several
goals and values, consumers may be subjected to the behavioral
bias of bounded rationality (62, 63). Consumers have a complex
decision to make, which may be impeded by their limited
knowledge and capacity to process all available information (64).
There is the possibility of providing too much choice. Schram
and Sonnemans (65) examined the effect of the number of
available policies and the switching costs on decision quality
when selecting health insurance, finding that most participants
searched based on attributes (e.g., premium costs, out-of-pocket
costs) rather than policies. When the number of alternatives
increased, decision-making time increased, and participants
considered less of the information presented, were more likely
to switch between policies, and decision quality decreased.
Future research should examine the reasoning process when
selecting care options, such as through vignettes; for example,
how much advice given from a trusted source is enough to help
with a decision, and whether there is an optimum amount of
information that should be available.
In such complex decision-making tasks, consumers will
benefit from being offered decision support tools similar to
those used in healthcare to inform shared decision making. For
example, Option Grids are summary tables, using one side of
paper to enable rapid comparisons of options, using questions
that patients frequently ask and designed for face-to-face clinical
encounters; other patient decision aids, usually with high content
levels, are designed for patients to use independently, either
before or after visits (66). Such tools make options more visible,
enhance patients’ confidence, and increase patient involvement
in collaborative dialogues.
Further evidence for the effects of decisions tools comes
from health insurance markets. In the US, as part of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, tens of millions
of people are choosing health coverage on a state or federal
health insurance exchange. The Massachusetts “Connector” is a
health insurance exchange that used to simultaneously present 25
plans from 6 insurance providers. Later, plans were reorganized
into three tiers of coverage, categorized by premiums and
out-of-pocket costs where consumers first chose one of these
levels and then saw a smaller set of plans within a level. This
simple change made consumers more sensitive to premium
and out-of-pocket costs, doubling the market shares for some
carriers (67).
There are cultural, demographic, and individual differences
that may need to be considered. Dionigi (68) reviews how
different cultures have different perceptions of what aging
means. Whereas, some find aging threatening (such as losing
independence or associating it with illness), others believe aging
demonstrates wealth and knowledge. Where negative views of
aging exist, Kotter-Grühn (69) suggests that the media can
reduce negative stereotypes of old age and influence societal
views. Telling participants positive information about their
performance relative to others induces positive age-related
perceptions and makes older adults feel younger (70). To
improve individuals’ perceptions of, and engagement with, old
age, interventions could provide positive case studies about the
different types of social care insurance. Such interventions may
also include prompting individuals to reflect on aging as a process
of maturation and enrichment. This may motivate uptake of care
insurance as a way to secure flourishing in old age.
Recent evidence also suggests that persuasive messages should
be tailored to the age of the recipient, as beliefs about the
benefits of aging are mixed between younger, middle, and older
generations (25). The authors report varying responses to social
care investment, such as “avoiding it,” “living for today,” “saving
anyway,” and “protecting own assets” (e.g., older individuals
might buy care insurance to protect their assets).
After purchasing care insurance, individuals may need to
make sure that regular spending correlates with this decision.
Such financial behavior change would include setting a financial
goal and identifying achievable steps such as making weekly or
monthlymonitoring and paying into a savings account ormaking
investments. There has been growth in the availability of goal-
based savings tools from financial institutions in recent years
[see (46, 71)]. For example, a tool by RBS/NatWest showed that
a conscious commitment significantly increased the amount of
saving per month, which was achieved by standing order or
regular transfer. Moreover, with the introduction of the Pension
Freedoms in 2014, flexibility in accessing the pension savings is
thought to help with investment in long-term care products by
using parts of pension contributions (72).
Another effective strategy based on reflective motivations
is ‘implementation intentions’. Implementation intentions help
people to self-regulate their goal commitment by translating
expectations of success and value into goal commitment (73, 74).
This technique leads individuals through a specified sequence
of three steps: (1) identifying an important goal that is directed
toward behavior change and that a person expects to be able to
attain (e.g., “saving more for care insurance”); (2) identifying
and imagining the most favorable outcome associated with
successfully changing the behavior and achieving the goal
(e.g., “greater well-being in old age”); and (3) identifying and
imagining the most critical obstacle that stands in the way of
wish fulfillment (e.g., “eating out on weekends”). Implementation
intentions could be used to help individuals overcome mental
obstacles to investing in their longer-term care.
Having clear goals is important. People who have clear
motivations are more capable of overcoming barriers and are
also more likely to take preparatory actions. Some population
segments may be more likely to invest in care insurance if they
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have a particular goal in mind, such as a high standard of
life or wishing to remain in a geographical location. Insurance
advisors could prompt individuals to think of their long-term
life goals. Psychological studies of future-time perspective and
goal orientation have found that people who are supported to
make long-term life plans are more likely to make investments
and contribute toward their retirement (75). More research is
required to see whether this holds for investments in social care.
Automatic Motivation
Interventions that target automatic motivation generally focus on
changing the context in which the behavior occurs, rather than on
people’s minds and beliefs about what they should do. Much of
what people do is not so much thought about; rather, it simply
comes about (76). While people may engage in rational cost-
benefit analyses about different social care insurance options,
aspects of the decision-making process may occur without much
deliberative reasoning.
In this section, we apply the principles of the MINDSPACE
framework (31, 32) that were detailed in Table 3. The
MINDSPACE framework is a summary categorization of nine
mostly automatic and contextual effects on motivation and
behavior. MINDSPACE is also an acronym that describes
the most effective ways to influence automatic motivation.
Our overall recommendations are provided in Table 4 beneath
those related to the Capabilities, Opportunities, and (reflective)
Motivation. There are some overlaps between these suggestions,
which are noted where relevant in what follows.
Messengers
The person who communicates the information can be as, if not
more, important as the content of the information itself, which
is the Messenger effect. One aspect of an effective messenger is
that people like them, which is related to the halo effect (77). The
halo effect is a cognitive bias that occurs when a person making
an initial assessment of another person assumes ambiguous
information, such as expertise, based upon concrete information,
such as looking attractive and well-groomed. If someone portrays
themselves as a likable person, they may be more persuasive.
We may also see authoritative or trustworthy individuals, such
as local community leaders, as role models (78), and whether
they suggest the insurance product can influence our decision.
Other important messengers include family and friends, which
were discussed above as enablers of capabilities and opportunities
within reflective motivations.
Incentives
Mental shortcuts shape the ways that people react to Incentives
to invest in social care insurance. One mental shortcut is
framing, which describes how different presentations of the same
information can lead to different choices. Specific presentations
highlight certain aspects of the outcomes or make some
information more prominent (79). Frames work because they
trigger biases such as reference dependence and loss aversion.
Different frames may push consumers’ away from social care
insurance if they perceive the product as expensive. For example,
the limited demand for life annuities (which insure late-life
consumption, in contrast to savings accounts) is explained
by consumers evaluating annuity products using a narrow
“investment frame” (focusing on the intermediate results of
return and risk) rather than a “consumption frame” (focusing on
the end result of spending over time).
Survey evidence reveals that these frames impact people’s
preferences. The majority of consumers prefer a life annuity
over a savings account when the choice is framed in terms of
consumption (e.g., using words such as “spend” and “payment”
vs. words such as “invest” and “earnings”) (80). Under the
narrow investment frame, the annuity is perceived riskier because
its return depends on a random variable. Therefore, the care
insurance product would benefit from being advertised in the
appropriate frame; for example, the least expensive way possible
(e.g., spreading the cost weekly rather than annually). Future
research could investigate the most attractive framing by asking
people to select from a variety of options for payment (e.g.,
more up-front payment, spreading the cost weekly, monthly
or bi-annually).
Alternatively, price dripping involves presenting a “good” cost
first to encourage psychological investment (23). For example,
later-life insurance has an array of options which can be added
later at an additional cost based on the emerging needs of
an individual. Applying price dripping may involve marketing
basic insurance cover (e.g., costs associated with long-term care
home). After the consumer purchases this product, the insurance
provider can offer a more expensive product, which includes
the cost of additional care, e.g., dementia care cover (11). Here,
individuals may be less likely to back out because the initial price
quoted makes them psychologically invested.
Time is another decision attribute influencing the choice
of care insurance. Present bias affects decisions when there
are long gaps between insurance payments and future care.
It is caused by temporal discounting (81), where immediate
rewards are weighted much more heavily than future rewards.
To combat this bias, when discussing insurance packages that
requiremonthly payments, a timeline could provide a breakdown
of spending on specific care needs at different future time
points (e.g., an unexpected illness, diagnosis of a long-term
or chronic condition, or general age-related health changes
requiring additional care needs).
The behavioral bias of mental accounting (82) may be
implicated here, too. According to this bias, people tend to
allocate different rewards or payoffs to discrete mental accounts
based on subjective criteria, including the source of the money
and its intended (e.g., consumption, savings, children’s education,
holidays, etc.). A care savings “pot” could be fed from a specific
income source stipulated via the personal finance industry or
through workplace pension contributions specifically for long-
term care needs. People are reluctant to take or reallocate money
out of such mental accounts, and asking someone to pay for care
insurance implies they will be allocating money to something
new. A possible solution is to make the care insurance offer when
an expenditure is terminated (e.g., children leave home). Future
research could consist of surveys with scenarios and hypothetical
questions that examine a range of circumstances to serve as a
guideline for optimum “purchase points.”
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Consumers assess payments in relative and not absolute
terms, especially as gains and losses relative to a reference point.
The choice of insurance products may be unstable and vary
depending on the reference point (36). Consumers may perceive
social care insurance as cheap when it is sold together (as an
add-on) with a product that has a comparatively higher price,
such as a mortgage. Promotion messages could utilize feelings of
loss aversion productively: a seller of pay-in insurance needs to
ensure the money spent on such products is not perceived as a
loss. This could be achieved by focusing on the losses associated
with not investing in social care (83), such as losing one’s home,
large sums of money when care needs suddenly occur, choice of
geographical location, etc. In some cases, a sense of loss aversion
may be provoked by marketing insurance as a “limited edition”
package or imposing a “time limit” (e.g., an offer only available
for 3 months).
Another type of loss aversion may occur when individuals or
families need to reduce consumption or income to pay for care
insurance. An original intervention from behavioral economics
addresses this challenge. Thaler and Benartzi’s (84) Save More
Tomorrow scheme offered each employee an opportunity to
commit a portion of their future salary increases toward
retirement savings. A large majority (78%) joined, and the
average savings rate increased from 3.5 to 13.6% over 40 months.
People easily “spend” future income because they discount
future rewards and also because such future spending does
not reduce current consumption (i.e., it is not perceived as a
loss). This approach could be applied to increase the uptake of
care insurance.
Norms
TheNorms aspect of automatic motivation refers to the influence
of others in shaping what we do. Some of these were covered
in Opportunities above. To recap, if family members or friends
select a package, others may conform to this behavior. However,
if others have not adopted an insurance policy, others may be
less likely to invest because they are unwilling to break the
social norm. To engage individuals with pre-paid insurance
packages, messages communicating the norm should refer to
different reference groups. This mechanism was demonstrated
in a field experiment testing social normative messages in letters
to individuals in tax arrears (85). The treatment groups received
identical letters, but with an added social normative message in
the form “9 out of 10 people in your ___ pay their tax on time”
where the ____ was between either “local area” or “country,”
The results indicated that all these treatments were effective at
encouraging compliance, but the most effective treatment used
the “local area” as the reference group.
Norm-based messages like these could be tested and used.
For example, the reference group could be changed to be
family members, friends, colleagues, or those in a particular
geographic region. If a norm is desirable, this information
could be communicated descriptively, such as, “9 out of 10
people in your local area plan for their long-term care.” If the
norm is not desirable, injunctive norms could be used, which
communicate information about what is desirable or accepted
(86). For example, an injunctive message could be, “9 out of
10 people in your local area think it is important to plan for
their long-term care.” Equally, it is important to avoid providing
information that many people do not plan for their long-term
care because this could produce a “boomerang” effect whereby
people become even less likely to take up social care insurance
(31, 32).
Defaults
The finding of large Default effects is one of the most robust
results in the applied economics literature (87). We tend
to go with the flow of pre-set options (31, 32). Madrian
and Shea (88) tested the effect of changing the default for
retirement savings in the U.S from non-enrollment to enrollment
at 3% in a money market fund. In both cases, employees
could override the default. The change had a large impact
on participation 1 year after joining the company: 86% for
those who were automatically enrolled and 49% for those
who were not. Choi et al. (89) showed that the findings
generalized to six companies in different industries. Similar
results come from Johnson et al. (45), where participants were
asked to imagine buying health insurance for their family
(themselves, a partner, and a child) and choose between
different plans using websites modeled on current exchanges.
Participants with a pre-selected default (the most cost-effective
option) performed significantly better in selecting the most cost-
effective plan.
Given these studies, policies utilizing the power of defaults
can nudge consumers toward more beneficial choices. At the
workplace, employers could automatically enroll employees in
an opt-out Pure Protection (pre-paid) policy (as it is less risky).
Given the multiple options that might exist within the care
insurance market, and that some individuals are not aware
of what exists, defaults may be an effective way to increase
uptake (90). Standing orders or direct debits into savings
accounts can facilitate goal achievement using defaults, building
upon the goal achievement research discussed in the reflection
Motivations above.
In some cases, individuals may rely on state-funded care
insurance since this is the default – and may not be aware of
the alternatives. Status quo bias (91) predicts that individuals
may prefer to keep things as they are by doing nothing (i.e.,
continue paying tax, not looking into other social care insurance
packages). The FCA (36) reported that consumers of financial
products often stick with the default option, or choose sub-
optimally by picking the cheapest or first seen option. In general,
where default options exist, a large proportion of consumers
will remain with the default (92). Where default choices are
undesirable, follow-up and engagement prompts could be used
(28). Additionally, if consumers are adversely affected by a
default option, policymakers can obtain information about true
preferences by examining how consumers choose when they
make an active decision.
Salience
Consumers’ attention is drawn to what is novel and seems
relevant to them – that is, what is Salient (31, 32). For example,
consumers may prefer care insurance information presented
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org 11 November 2020 | Volume 8 | Article 564471
Vlaev et al. Social Care Insurance: A Review
to them in a simple format because it is easier to extract
relevant information, especially for cognitively demanding
decisions about health, as was found with medical decisions
(93). Psychologists and marketing experts have long known
that surveying people draws their attention to risks or choices
with otherwise little salience, inducing behavioral change (94).
Zwane et al. (95) demonstrated that completing a household
finances survey increased the uptake of medical insurance. The
authors speculate that people usually focus on more pressing
issues about resources, and a survey makes neglected needs more
salient, motivating an active decision. Feedback can be provided
to consumers to make progress on their savings goals (from
the reflective motivation section above) more salient, such as
warnings if they are unlikely to meet their goals and suggestions
to increase saving amounts.
Salience can also be induced by the process of choice-set
dependence (96). Individuals may change their preferred option
depending on what other options are available; if something
stands out as more relevant to the individual’s need, this
may become the salient choice. This can be activated through
the similarity effect, where similar options are presented in a
choice set which also includes a third, more distinctly unique
option (the “salient” option). Simonson and Tversky (97) found
that decision-makers were more likely to opt for this salient
option. Marketing of social care insurance could adopt a similar
approach because such packages may have multiple options with
different levels of associated costs.
Priming
People’s decisions about social care can be influenced by sub-
conscious cues in the environment, a phenomenon known
as Priming. The “truth effect” is one type of priming: if we
hear about something, we are likely to remember it as a fact
(98). In a care insurance context, this may relate to hearing
negative information about, for example, state social care, and
individuals may not wish to go through a similar negative
experience. Importantly, we tend to remember negative more
than positive information (99). Media reports and related Care
Quality Commission reports often report negative stories about
care homes. These negative stories are easily accessible in
memory (25) and could be used in the promotion of private
care plans. Because of such “memory availability” (aka priming)
effects, people pay far more for flight insurance but do not buy
flood or earthquake insurance even when subsidized and priced
below its actuarially fair price (100). Alternatively, people may
be exposed to positive media news about the quality of private
healthcare, which creates a window of opportunity to promote
private social care insurance.
Affect
How people feel (in an Affective, or emotional, sense) about
social care insurance can affect their decisions to purchase it.
Seemingly irrelevant features of the product offer may provoke
emotions that influence buying decisions. Bertrand et al. (101)
found that adding a smiling photo of a woman to a letter from
a bank offering loans increases the likelihood of borrowing by
just as much as dropping the interest rate by about 30%, for both
men and women alike. This suggests that the photo triggers a
positive emotion that impacts evaluation of the financial offer.
Specific emotions, such as guilt or anxiety, can play a role in
risk perceptions (102), and negative feelings can induce biases in
thinking such that people overestimate risks (103). Risk aversion
is thought to increase when anxiety and fear are induced (104).
People may act to avoid stress, and their insurance-related
decisions can be distorted by temporary strong emotions such
as fear. For example, consumers may buy expensive insurance
for peace-of-mind, even when they are unlikely to need it (36).
Therefore, focusing on peace-of-mind in campaigns promoting
care insurance might increase uptake.
Individuals who have been subjected to an emotional trigger
event such as an illness might be more prone to purchase care
insurance. In such situations, individuals are in a “hot state” (e.g.,
fear, pain) whichmotivates them to take instant actions to try and
remedy the incident that occurred. Moreover, people also expect
their current feelings to continue in the future and underestimate
the effect of possible changes, which is known as the projection
bias (105). Therefore, critical events create an opportunity for
offering care insurance to those who have not planned for care.
The frequency of events matters, too:
Frequent exposure leads to recognition which causes
likeability, known as the recognition effect (106). DeJoy (107)
argues that the more familiar we become with something, the
more likely we are to choose it as we do not see it as threatening.
A well-known health insurance brand, such as BUPA, could be
used to promote social care insurance.
Commitment
People are more likely to take up social care insurance if they
make a Commitment to doing so. Insurance companies could
utilize this by providing a temporary commitment “holding”
period, whereby they hold certain offers for customers whilst
they await their decision (108). This could work for pre-paid
insurance types (Pure Protection and Investment Linked), as
individuals may need time to consider the full cost implications
of the investment. The FCA suggests that in some cases the
use of free trial periods – also known as the foot in the door
technique (109) – could be effective because people do not
want to miss out the free deal, and, by the time the free
period expires, they feel committed to the product (36). In
other situations, where individuals have invested in a particular
product previously, they may hold this commitment strongly
and thereby commit to the same product consistently. Such
a sense of commitment may transfer to another product
from the same provider (e.g., individuals holding a BUPA
health insurance policy may also willingly buy BUPA care
insurance). Guadagno and Cialdini (110) report that this is
particularly true of older individuals or where emotions play
a role.
Ego
People tend to act in ways that make them feel better
about themselves, which is the Ego principle. Consumers may
experience optimism bias (111) such that they underestimate
the probability of bad outcomes happening to them when
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compared with other people. Optimism about good outcomes
being more likely than bad outcomes can lead to consumers
taking on risky investment products, which might drive them
to choose investment-linked care insurance. Optimism bias may
also reduce uptake of care insurance because individuals may
believe that they will not need it.
To overcome the effect of such a bias in retirement saving
decisions, Hershfield et al. (112) showed participants realistic
age-progressed renderings of themselves to make the need to save
enough for retirement more salient, and to encourage them to
identify with their future selves. Participants could decide how
much they wanted to save on a slider: if they indicated a low
amount, they saw an age-progressed rendering of themselves
frowning, whereas if they indicated a high amount, they saw
the same figure smiling. The age-progressed renderings resulted
in more than twice as much ($172 v $80, on average) being
deposited in a hypothetical account than those who saw non-age-
progressed renderings.
Overconfidence is closely related to the ego principle of
influence (113, 114). People are overconfident about their abilities
and successes at different tasks (e.g., self-control, accuracy
of judgements, etc.). Overconfidence may lead consumers to
over-borrow and increase the likelihood of defaulting on
their mortgage or credit card because they underestimate
how much they will borrow and be able to repay when
the teaser rates expire (36). Overconfident people with self-
control problems may misestimate their future use of the
product or its features. Remedies should warn consumers of
their overconfidence with forceful examples, such as about
their ability to pay for social care or to manage their
care needs.
Overconfidence errors can be harnessed because consumers
are likely to buy products that they will underuse. Care
insurance policies could benefit from overconfidence by setting
low prices for products (and thus making them more attractive)
given consumers’ mispredictions about future usage. Tariffs
which use a low fixed charge and high per-usage charge
are also popular when consumers underestimate usage (36).
Therefore, one can increase uptake by offering consumers
pre-paid insurance (pure protection or investment-linked) at
a relatively low price, and later, when consumers realize
their care needs are more demanding than expected, offering
them upgrades to time-of-need insurance (immediate care or
late-life policies).
CONCLUSIONS
This report presented a summary of behavioral influences that
may be implicated in the market for social care insurance in
England. Drawing on work from behavioral economics and
psychology, we discussed interventions that might increase the
uptake of social care insurance. This is an important topic
because uptake of social care insurance is very low in England,
with < 1% of individuals opting for long-term paid social care in
advance of their needs (23).
We followed the COM-B Framework, which takes into
account the capabilities, opportunities, and motivations for the
five insurance types listed in Table 1. The COM-B analysis
provided an in-depth discussion of the behavioral drivers of
investing in different kinds of social care insurance products.
An important factor implicated in this issue may be the lack
of knowledge surrounding social care insurance. As stipulated
in the recent RAND (7) report, all UK citizens need to be
provided general information about social care. The lack of
such education may induce a range of behavioral biases that
could negatively impact decisions. Investments in social care
should not be taken lightly, and, therefore, consumers should
be presented with fair and transparent information that supports
informed choice.
Despite information and education, consumers may still
struggle with making a decision – or may select options
that are not suited to them – due to complex product
options, the impact of emotions, and numerous other behavioral
biases. Taking this into account, we suggest some possible
remedies, especially for organizations that market care insurance
products. Some of those policy remedies include making the
required decision-making process simpler, as well as motivating
citizens to invest in social care products by applying various
behavioral techniques. Policy interventions must also aim to
reduce social and economic inequalities where possible, which
may, in the future, require re-considering how social care is
publicly funded.
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